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People readily though not inevitably develop strong loy-
alties to their own ethnic group and discriminate against 
outsiders. In this report I use cross-cultural data to (II 
determine the factors that strengthen and weaken these 
tendencies and (II ascertain whether they have dle same 
determinants. It is often supposed that ethnocentrism 
and xenophobia are opposite sides of the same coin, but 
a few voices have cautioned that this need not be the 
case_ 
Van den Berghe 119991 points out that it would be mal-
adaptive for xenophobia to be an inevitable resu lt of eth-
nocentrism. Ethnic affiliation, he reminds us, usually 
involves some clainl of common ancestry Ireal or fictive), 
and a propensity to favor fellow ethnics is no doubt cn-
hanced by this feeling of kinSllip. But rcciprocal rela-
tionships with members of other groups can frequently 
be adaptive also, and it would be foolish to assume an 
attitude of hostiliry. The threshold for cooperation may 
be highcr and the insistence on reciprocity may be 
greater, but a smart opportunist keeps his options open. 
Recent experimental work in psychology also suggests 
that in-group favoritism is not a necessary concomitant 
of out-group hostiliry (Rabbie 1982, 1992; Ray and Love-
joy 1986; Struch and Schwartz 19891. While both can be 
enhanced by competition and external threats (sec Sherif 
1961 for the classic field experimentl, in-group favorit-
ism should be expected only if affiliation with the in-
group can successfully counter the competitive threat 
(Rabbie et al 19741. If a group is unable to be successful, 
hostility to outsiders may be mirrored by ethnic break-
down and further hostility and competition within the 
group. Finally, threats can arise from environmental ca-
tastrophes as well as from outsiders, and we might expect 
that such disasters would foster enhanced group loyalty 
without any concomitant hostility to outsiders. 
The cross-cultural data analyzed here provide no sup-
port for the proposition that out-group hostility is a nec-
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essary concomitant of in-group loyalty. The thIeat to the 
group that arises from catastrophic food shortage en-
hances ethnic loyalty without increasing hostility to out-
side groups, and even when the threat arises from other 
groups lexternal waIfare), the associated ethnocentrism 
and xenophobia seem to have different causes. Overall, 
ethnocentrism and xenophobia were uncorrelated in this 
dataset, with the latter being most strongly associated 
wi th the overall level of violence wi thin as well as be-
tween ethnic groups. 
METHODS 
The study uses published codes and data collected for 
the standard cross-cultural sample of 186 societies IMur-
dock and White I969). The sample was selected to max-
imize geograpbk and linguistic independence. The phy-
logenetic methods advocated by Mace and Pagel (I994) 
to enSUIe independence were not used here both for the-
oretical reasons suggested elsewhere (Rogers and Cash-
dan 1997) and because the intensity of intraethnic loyalty 
and the intensiry of interethnic hostility arc highly labile 
traits and therefore unlikely to be affected by distant 
historical connections between societ.ies. Each society 
in the sample is pinpointed to a specific place and time; 
for most societies, that time is the early to middle 20th 
century. 
Ross (1983) and Lang (I995) have independently used 
somewhat different subsets of the standard sample to 
code both ethnic loyalty and out-group hostility. Ross 
defines the former as "in-group loyalty, or we feeling, 
directed towards the wide society II (Le., in contrast to 
the local communiry, which he coded separately). Lang's 
definition refers specifically to "loyalty within the eth-
nic group," loyalty being defined as "consciousness of 
belonging together." Both measures of out-group hostil-
ity refer to attitudes rather than behaviors: Ross's mea-
SUIe "seeks to evaluate the feelings towards other soci-
eties" and Lang's definition specifics Ifnegative attitudes 
and emotions, contempt, mistrust. II As with the loyalty 
measures, Ross specifics hostility to /lather societies II 
while Lang specifies hostility to "other ethnic groups." 
I have sometimes reversed the order of Ross's ratings in 
order to make them consistent with those of Lang and 
the other researchers cited. In all cases reported here, 
larger numbers indicate more of a variable (greater loy-
alty, morc frequent warfare, more severe famine, etc.). 
The measures of Ross and Lang are Significantly, al-
though not strongly, correlated with each other. 
Two types of threat are considered here: famine, coded 
independently by Ember and Ember (1992b) and Dirks 
(1993), and external warfare, coded independently by Em-
ber and Ember (1992b), Ross (1983), and Lang (1995). As 
with the loyalty and hostility vaIiables, consistent re-
sults from independently derived data allow greater con-
fidence in the conclusions. These and other variables 
used in the analysis arc fully defined in the appendix. 
All data are available not only in the cited sources but 
in the electronic journal World Cultures. 
Nonparametric statistics {Spearman's correlation co~ 
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TABLE J 
Intraethnic Loyalty and Interethnic Warfare 
Loyalty IRossl Loyalty ILang) 
Measure r, p n r, p n 
All societies 
External warfare {R) .11 .07 74 .JO .04 45 
External warfare {EI 
·44 .0006 59 .18 .01 6) 
ExternaJ warfare ILl 
·J3 n.s. 35 .I1 n.S. 61 
lnterethnic violence 




External warfare jR) 
·45 .001 47 ·45 .01 )0 
External warfare {E) .60 <.000 1 37 .}2 .04 41 
External warfare I L) 
·ll n.s. 11 ·35 .01 41 
Interethnic violence .63 .0002 )0 
·J7 .008 50 
ILl 
NOTE: See text and appendix for variable definitions. 
SOURCES: R, Ross {1983/; E, Ember and Ember 1199lbl; L, Lang 
119951· 
efficients) are used throughout becausc the data are or-
dinal, with most variables taking only four values. Al-
though I have predicted the direction of effects, all 
significance tests reported below are two-tailed. 
INTRA ETHNIC LOYAL TV 
Threats and competition from outside groups arc often 
cited as an important force in fostering ethnic loyalty 
(Levine and Campbell 1972, Roosens 1989, van der Den-
nen '987, DUIham 1994). In order to explore this prop-
osition cross-culturally, I correlated frequency of exter-
nal warfare, as measured by Ross (1983), Lang (1995), and 
Ember and Ember (r992b), with ethnic loyalty as mea-
sured by Ross (1983) and Lang (1995). As table I shows, 
this proposition receives support from the codings of 
Ross and Ember and Ember. The absence of patterning 
with Lang's external-warfare variable probably derives 
from differences in the way this variable was coded. 
Lang's definition of external warfare differs in applying 
only to societies in which formal political offices are 
present. His measure of interethnic violence (I/frequency 
of intercthnic violence/attacking") is applicable to all 
societies and shows patterning similar in strength and 
direction to the external-warfare vanables of Ross and 
Ember and Ember. The absence of association with 
Lang's measure of warfare suggests that external warfare 
promotes ethnic loyalty more strongly in egalitarian 
societies. 
Ember and Ember, noting that some societIes lack waI-
faIe only because they have been pacified, omitted such 
societies from their sample when they analyzed the de-
terminants of warfaIe, since pacified societies might still 
have conditions that predisposed to it (1992a, b). I used 
their measure of pacification for an analogous reason and 
found that the relationship between external warfare and 
ethnic loyalty was much stronger when only unpacified 
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TABLE 1 
lntraethnic Loyalty and Risk of Famine 
Loyalty IRossl Loyalty ILangl 
Measure r, 
Routine food shortage 
Chronic resource problems IE) .07 
Ordinary nutntion (D) -.13 
Short-term starvation (DJ .07 
Seasonal starvation (D) -.Ol-
Catasuophic food shortage 
Threat of famine (E) 
·39 
Severity of famine IDI .19 
Persistence of famine IDJ 
·37 
Recurrence of famlDe (0) 
·30 
Catastrophic food shortage, unpaciflcd 
societies only 
Threat of famine \E) .5 8 
Severity of famine \D) .41 
Persistence of famine (OJ .63 
Recurrence or famine \01 
·4' 
NOTE: See appendix for variable definitions. 
SOURCES: E, Ember and Ember 11992b), D, Dirks 119931. 
societies were considered. Pacification need not mean 
the end of interethnic competition-indeed, colonialism 
has often exacerbated it (Gulliver 1969, Arens 1978, 
Roosens 19891-hence we might expect that absence of 
warfare due to pacification would typically not remove 
the competitive pressures that lead to strengrhened eth-
nic loyalty. In order words, warfare in pacified societies 
was suppressed btIt the competition that fostered ethnic 
loyalty typically was not. U this argument is correct, 
including pacified societies would weaken the correla-
tion between frequency of warfare and ethnic loyalty, as 
it does here (see table I). 
Threats to the group need not come from outsiders. In 
order to see whether environmentally induced hardships 
also promote group loyalty, I correlated loyalty with var-
ious measures of food stress and famine. As table 2 
shows, routine food shortage (mild, chronic, or seasonal) 
has no effect on ethnic loyalty whereas real famine (se-
vere and socially disruptive food shortage) has a mod-
erate but statically significant positive effect. The strong-
est correlations are with tlueat of famine as measured 
by Ember and Ember and persistence of famine as mea-
sured by Dirks. Threat of famine measures the likelihood 
of its occurrence and is chiefly a measure of frequency. 
Persistence of famine assesses specifically how often liv-
ing members of the society have experienced famine (see 
appendix for complete definitions). Famine, by Dirks's 
definition, is never routine, but a society that has some 
experience of it in its cultural memory might be more 
likely to respond in productive, culturally mediated 
ways. A society facing famine with no history to guide 
It might be more susceptible to societal chaos and the 
breakdown of mutual support. 
Table 2 also shows that the correlation between fam-
ine and ethnic loyalty is stronger when the sample is 
p n r, p n 
n.s. 54 .05 n.s. \5 
n.S. )2 .11 D.S. Il 
D.S. 74 .08 n.s. 80 
n.s. 7J .03 n.s. 80 
.008 44 ·'3 .11 48 
n.s. 51 .17 n,s. 14 
.009 49 .,8 .04 56 
.02 59 .17 n,S. 67 
.0009 29 .42 .02 P 
.0> 33 .24 n.S. 36 
.0002 30 ·39 .0' 38 
.007 39 .19 n.s. 46 
limited to unpacified societies. This result was unantic-
ipatcd, but the explanation may lie in the greater infra-
structure and organizational complexity of tbe "pacify_ 
ing" society, together with the economic dependency 
such a situation often imposes. Any society able to pacify 
another is likely to be better able to buffer food sbortages 
through storage and trade, so perhaps people in pacified 
societies respond to famine by relying on the dominant 
society rather than by bonding together to help 
themselves. 
I explored some likely antecedents of warfare and fam-
ine to see whether these variables were also correlated 
with ethnic loyalty but found no relationships. Variables 
I considered included measures of density pressure (pop-
ulation density, land availability, agricultural intensifi-
cationl, Ember's measure of natural disasters (a correlate 
of warfare), and various climatological measures of 
harshness and unpredictability (a possible cause of fam-
ine). Variable and unpredictable climates have a strong 
effect on the spatial extent of ethnic groups (Cashdan 
r991), but I found no consistent climatic associations 
with ethnic loyalty or interethnic hostility. 
INTERETHNIC HOSTILITY 
If interethnic hostility is the flip side of intraethnic loy-
alty, the two should be strongly correlated and have the 
same determinants. Neither is the case. 
Both external warfare and famine are associated WIth 
ethnic loyalty. It is reasonable to expect external warfare 
to be associated with interethnic hostility, and table 3 
shows that this is indeed the case. But interethnic hos-
tility is also associated with internal warfare (warfare 
between communities of the same society or ethnic 
group); the associations are in the same positive direction 
and of similar magnitude. The same is true of Lang's 
measures of intra- and interethnic violence Isee table 3), 
and Ross's measures of local and intercommunity con-
flict show trends in the same direction. Taken together, 
these data suggest that hostility to outsiders is not sim-
ply a direct response to external threat but is likely to 
reflect the prevailing level of violence in the region. 
Levine and Campbell 11972:213-14) note that while 
most theories of ethnicity predict an inverse relationship 
between in-group loyalty and out-group hostility lalbeit 
for different reasons), other theories predict a continuity 
in the violence experienced at different levels of group-
ing. These data suggest there is a continuity of violence 
at local lintraethnic) and regional linterethnicl levels 
rather than the discontinuity that would result if in-
group loyalty were reflected in out-group hostility. 
Fanlinc, the other threat considered here, is correlated 
with ethnic loyalty but not with interethnic hostility. 
The lack of correlation may reflect the complexity of 
these relationships, as illustrated by Levine and Camp-
bell's account of catastrophic food shortages in Kenya. 
They argue that while destruction of cattle by rinderpest 
exacerbated out-group hostility, famines due to grain 
crop failures in the same area "were traditionally times 
of formal peacemaking, increased trade, sharing across 
ethnic group lines, and the peaceable transfer of children 
and women from the group with most famine to others 
more fortunate, in exchange for grain" ILevine and 
Campbell 1972:36). 
Rabbie Ir982, 1992) has shown experimentally that in-
tragroup cooperation can foster an in-group bias without 
necessarily increasing the level of hostility between 
groups. This finding is supported in this dataset by the 
relationship between crosscutting ties within a society 
Idata from Ross) and ethnic loyalty as measured by Ross 
Ir, = .62, P < .0001, n = 77) and Lang Ir, = ·40, P = .005, 
n = 47) and the absence of any such correlation with 
hostility. Extensive crosscutting ties Ipresumably related 
TABLE J 
Hostility to Other Societies, Violence, and Warfare 
Hostility (Ross) Hostility (Lang) 
Measure r, p n r, p n 
Interethnic fighting 
External warfare (RI 
·72 <.000 1 68 ·J4 .0J 42 
External warfare tE) 
. J' .02 S3 ·17 n.s . S6 
External warfare IL) 
·J4 .07 JO ·J7 .008 52 
Interethnic violence IL) 
·J4 .OJ J9 . 19 n .S . 64 
Intraethnic fighting 
lnternal warfare (RJ 
·47 <.000 1 69 . 12 n.s . 4J 
lnternal warfare lEI .48 .0005 49 .29 .04 So 
lntraethnic violence ILl 
·40 .007 45 .21 .09 68 
lntercommunity con· 
·J7 .002 69 . 07 n.S . 40 
fliet IR) 
Local conflict {RJ . 22 .06 69 .24 n.s . 40 
NOTE: See appendix for variable definitions. 
SOURCE: R, Ross (1983); L, Lang ( 19951; E, Ember and Ember 
{199 2 bJ. 
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TABLE 4 
lntraethnic Loyalty and Interethnic Hostility 
Correlates r, p n 
Loyalty (Lang) x loy-
·S4 .0001 44 
alty (Ross) 
HostLiity (Lang) x 
·J7 .OJ J6 
hostility [Ross) 
Loyalty x hostility -.06 n.s. 64 
ILang) 
Loyalty x hostility -.0 1 n.s. 69 
(Ross) 
Loyalty (Lang) x hos- .08 n.S. 41 
tility IRoss) 
Loyalty (Ross) x hos-
tility ILang) 
-.25 n.s. J9 
to the level of intragroup cooperation) foster ethnic loy-
alty but are unrelated to interethnic hostility. 
Since ethnic loyalty and interethnic hostility appear 
to have different determinants, we might expect them 
not to be strongly correlated. This is indeed the case. We 
see in table 4 both the correlation between Ross's and 
Lang's measures of the same variables and the absence 
of any relationships between ethnic loyalty and hostility 
to outsiders in either dataset. 
The absence of correlation between ethnic loyalty and 
hostility to outsiders is encouraging for the prospects of 
a peaceful multiethnic state and suggests that the flow-
ering of ethnicity is not necessarily something to fear. 
Most of the societies in this sample, however, were de-
scribed in the early to middle 20th century. As ethnic 
groups become increasingly class-based elements in 
complex societies, the frustration of being have-nots in 
a wealthy society is always a potential source of violence 
and hostility. What this study shows is that mterethnic 
hostility is not an integral part of strong ethnic identity 
and that its source must be sought elsewhere. 
APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND NOTES 
From Dirks I I 99 3): 
Falnine: /Ian episode of starvation that IS attended by 
sharply increased mortality rates and marked disruptions 
in community life. Its duration exceeds short-term star-
vation. Unlike seasonal starvation it does not occur an-
nually. Unlike short-term and seasonal starvation, fam-
ine lacks a routine character. It disrupts society from the 
start and it can progress to the point of massive msti-
tutional collapses" Ip. 30). IThis distinction parallels the 
distinction in table I between "routine food shortage" 
and "catastrophic food shortage.") 
Endemic starvation: "a condition of chronic under-
nutrition, unrelated to daily contingencies, season, or the 
fortunes that affect food availability in any particular 
year" (p. 30). "Endemic starvation exists when there is 
evidence that some members of society suffer caloric 
insufficiency under normal conditions. II 
Short-term starvation: "an episode of starvation that 
has a duration of a few days or weeks .... IThese episodes 
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arel typically reCUIrent and familiar. As a result, out-
breaks do not excite alarm land one I usually does nOt 
result in death" Ip. 30). 
Seasonal starvation: "occurs at regular times every 
year. It may last from several weeks to as long as three 
or four months. IIncreased morbidity and mortality] are 
not detected readily, and, until recently, not often re-
ported. Like short-term starvation, seasonal starvation 
is a familiar event. Consequently communities that ex-
perience it have a repertoire of customary adjustments 
by means of whicb they avoid social elisruption" Ip. 30). 
Severity of famine: "the extent to which a community 
or some segment of it progresses toward complete in-
stitutional breakdown" Ip. 31). 
Persistence of famine: "the frequency of its occurrence 
over a relatively short period of time 150 years]-how 
often a living set of generations has had cUrect experience 
with famine" Ip. 31). 
Recurrence of famine: "its repetition over long periods 
of time .... at least one famine in each of the two im-
meeliately preceeling centuries" Ip· 3r). 
From Ember and Ember Ir99.b): 
Famine: "a time of starvation when either many hu-
man deaths occur or it is reported that a substantial seg-
ment of the society has to move because of a lack of food 
... lor] the ethnograpber uses the word famine" Ip. r80). 
The measure "picks up only extremely serious resource 
problems" Ip. rBol and does not include chronic hunger. 
It is chiefly a measure of famine frequency. 
Chronic resource problems: elistinguished from "un-
predictable resource problems" Ip. 18I). 
Warfare: "socially organized armed combat between 
members of different territorial units Icommunities or 
aggregates of communities)" Ip. 17'). 
Internal warfare: "socially olganized armed combat be-
tween territorial units Icommunities or larger aggregates) 
within the same society. By 'society' we mean a more 
or less continuously elistributed population that speaks 
a common language" Ip· 173). 
External warfare: ,twar between the focal society and 
other societies" Ip. 173)· 
Pacification: lithe elimination of war by an external 
power before the twenty-live-year time period" Ip· I? 5). 
II considered societies coded I or 2 "unpacified."1 
From Lang 11995): 
Ethnic group: "group of persons perceiving themselves 
as unit and set themselves apart from other sucb units. 
The unity is based on real or supposed common origin, 
common fate, common language or relation, adherence 
to common nOlms and values" Ip. 50). 
Loyalty: "consciousness of belonging together ... the 
variable measures the degree of loyalty within the ethnic 
group as a whole. If for instance there are strong feelings 
of loyalty among a small part of the ethnic group and no 
loyalty within tbe group as a whole the code 1 I =Iow] 
applies" Ip. so). 
Hostility: "negative attitudes and emotions, contempt, 
mistrust" Ip. 5 rl . ICode incorporates both degree of bos-
tility and its targets; I lumped values for the elifferent 
types of targets so that the scale measured only degree 
of hostility.) 
External warfare: "warfare where at least one party 
involved is a maximal unit of political authority" Ip. 36). 
II deleted cases coded 0, "no formal political office pre-
sent/ since this does not discriminate the anlaunt of 
fighting in such societies.) 
Interethnic violence: "frequency of interethnic vio-
lence/attacking" Ip. 54).11 deleted tire few societies with 
no interethnic contact.) 
Intraethnic violence: "intensity of intraethnic via· 
lence" Ip· 54)· 
(Internal warfare was not rated for societies with "no 
political office above the level of the local community," 
more tban balf of the codable societies. I did not use 
these variables for this reason and because of tlreir lack 
of comparability with the internal-warfare measures of 
Ross and Ember.) 
From Ross 119B3): 
Loyalty to the wider society: "in-group loyalty, or we 
feeling, directed towards the wider society" lelistin-
guisbed from loyalty to tire local community, which 
Ross coded separately) Ip. IBo). 
Hostility toward otber societies: "bitter feelings" to-
ward "outsiders" Ip. 180). 
Internal warfare: warfare "between communities of 
same society" Ip· 179)· 
External warfare: "witlr otl,er societies" Ip. 179). 
Local conilict: political conflict and social conflict 
more generally at the local community level Ip. 177). 
Intercommunity conflict: conflict between commu-
nities of the same society Ip. 178). 
Crosscutting ties: "politicaUy relevant" links between 
inelividuals living in different communities of the same 
society Ip. 18 I). 
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